The Bank of England, 1694-2017 by Goodhart, Charles
  
Charles Goodhart 
The Bank of England, 1694-2017 
 
Book section (accepted version) 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Originally published in Edvinsson, R., Jacobson, T. and Waldenström, D., Sveriges Riksbank 
and the history of central banking. Studies in macroeconomic history. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2018, 143-171. 
 
© 2018 Cambridge University Press 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/89064/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: July 2018 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s submitted version of the book section. There may be differences 
between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the publisher’s 
version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
1 
 
 
The Bank of England, 1694-2017 
 
By C.A.E. Goodhart1 
Financial Markets Group 
London School of Economics 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
There have been four, officially commissioned, histories of the Bank of England, covering different, 
but overlapping, historical periods, by Sir John Clapham, 1694-1914, (2 Volumes), Prof. Richard 
Sayers, 1891-1944, (3 Volumes), John Fforde, 1941-1958, and, most recently, Forrest Capie, 1950s to 
1979.  For a review of the latter and a brief comparison with the earlier three histories, see Goodhart 
(2011).  A further official history, covering the period from the 1970s to 1998 has now been 
commissioned; Harold James will be its author.  Moreover, there are 20, or so, books, besides these 
official histories, with Bank of England in their title available on Amazon.  So there is no lack of 
historical coverage. 
 
So what can additionally be done now both briefly and of some potential interest, one might hope, 
to both reader and author?  The twist adopted here is not to take the story of the Bank 
chronologically, but to take each of the functional relationships and activities of the Bank separately 
and to explore how each of these relationships has developed over time, though giving most 
attention to their evolution since 1945, a 70 year period during much of which (1968-2000) I was 
myself directly involved with the Bank. 
 
                                                          
1   The author would like to thank the following for their constructive comments:  Susan Howson, 
Mervyn King, David Learmonth, Ben Norman, Brian Quinn, Paul Tempest, Ryland Thomas, Marilyne 
Tolle, and Geoffrey Wood, and a special mention for Forrest Capie, my discussant at the earlier 
Stockholm Conference, who saved me from numerous errors. 
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We start with the crucial relationship between the Bank of England and the Government.  Like most 
other Central Banks, the Bank of England was, and has remained, a creation of Government.  It was 
founded in 1694 on the basis of a quid pro quo; in exchange for providing finance, in the shape of 
bond purchases, to conduct war with France, the Bank of England was given certain special 
advantages; it was the only joint stock bank then allowed in England (unlike Scotland), and it was, 
very clearly, the Government’s preferred bank.  As Capie and Wood note (2015), “When the Bank of 
England was founded in 1694 it was not founded as a central bank.  The concept of a central bank 
did not exist in the seventeenth century”.  It was established by a Parliamentary Charter, which had 
to be reconsidered and renewed at discrete intervals, e.g. 21 years in the 1742 Act, (Clapham, pp 
95/96); such occasions of renegotiation of the Bank’s privileges naturally led the Bank to focus on its 
continuing relationship with the Government. 
 
We shall divide up analysis and discussion of the Bank’s on-going relationship with Government 
(Section 2) into three main parts, these are:- 
(i) Governance; 
(ii) Debt and cash flow management; 
(iii) Macro-monetary policy. 
 
Then we shall turn to the Bank’s relationship with people (Section 3), under four headings:- 
(i) The public as clients of the Bank as a commercial bank; 
(ii) The public as users of Bank of England note issue; 
(iii) The Bank’s Proprietors, shareholders; 
(iv) The Bank’s Directors, Governors, Court and Staff. 
 
Finally, we review the Bank’s relationship with the other commercial banks, under the headings:- 
(i) Managing the Payment System; 
(ii) Lender of Last Resort; 
(iii) Supervising the Banks; 
(iv) Bank Resolution. 
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Since there are no less than 11 functional sub-headings to review, over a period in each case of some 
322 years, the attention and detail given to each is, perforce, quite limited. 
 
2. Relationships with Government 
 
 
2(i) Governance 
The Bank of England was established in 1694, by Act of Parliament, as a private joint stock, limited 
liability, company, with a Charter subject to periodic renewal and renegotiation.  Each such occasion 
provided an opportunity for the Government of the day to try to extort further favourable financing.  
On the other hand the Bank’s privileges and its role as the Government’s preferred bank gave it a 
pre-eminent position amongst all other commercial banks in England and Wales, and its note 
circulation and deposits soon became large, prior to the second half of the 19th Century, both as a 
proportion of GDP and in relation to the broad money stock, see Figures 1 and 2 below:- 
 
Figure 1 
 
Source:  http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/Pages/onebank/threecenturies.aspx 
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Figure 2 
 
Source: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/Pages/onebank/threecenturies.aspx 
 
 
It was the large profits that the Bank made on the seignorage from its note issue that raised the ire 
of David Ricardo in his long pamphlet on ‘Proposals for an Economical and Secure Currency’ (1816), 
see later Section 3(i).  Ricardo believed that the provision of the bank note circulation and the 
seignorage profits thereby arising should be a public, not a private, function.  Although his analysis of 
the cause and extent of the depreciation of the pound from gold during the suspension of gold 
specie payments from 1797 to 1821 (during the Napoleonic Wars) differed from that of the Banking 
School, see Fetter (1978), Chapter 1, Ricardo thought that the Bank had not taken undue advantage 
of the Suspension to expand its balance sheet unduly. 
 
But there was always a danger that a privately run Bank might do so.  Ricardo then expanded his 
previously extremely brief comments on the appropriate institutional arrangements for note issue, 
into a later pamphlet, his ‘Plan for the Establishment of a National Bank’ (1824), published 
posthumously.  In this he argued for a separate public sector Currency Board to control the note 
issue, expanding in line with the availability of gold-backing at a fixed conversion price.  Since most 
commentators then would have defined ‘money’ as synonymous with notes and coin, and since 
Ricardo’s currency board would have had a monopoly of note issue, this was akin to proposing that 
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transactions balances, i.e. notes, should be issued by a ‘narrow bank’, while other bank assets, e.g. 
loans and securities, should be backed by non-strictly-monetary bank liabilities. 
 
After Ricardo’s death (1823), proposals to concentrate note issue in England were continued by his 
supporters, e.g. Colonel Torrens and his brother, Samson Ricardo, amongst what became known as 
the Currency School.  Following on some macro-economic disturbances in the 1830s, and 
dissatisfaction with the Bank of England’s policies at the time, (plus agreement that seignorage 
should accrue to the taxpayer, not to bankers), it did seem then possible that Ricardo’s idea for an 
independent Currency Board might get adopted, (see Fetter, Chapter VI, 1978). 
 
Fetter attributes the fact that this did not happen almost entirely to one man, Sir Robert Peel, the 
Prime Minister at the time.  Peel wrote a paper to his Cabinet colleagues offering three alternatives:- 
a) Leave everything as it was. 
b) A Ricardian independent Currency Board. 
c) Divide the Bank of England into two parts, with the Issue Department being, in effect, a 
Currency Board, and a separate Banking Department on top of that. 
Not surprisingly his Cabinet colleagues voted, virtually unanimously, for the compromise option (c).  
It had the virtue of avoiding unsettling institutional disruption, and of being more acceptable to the 
Bank.2  It also seemed to go sufficiently far to meet the demands of the Currency School. 
 
What is much less clear is whether Peel, or anybody else at the time, realised the crucial difference 
between having an independent Currency Board and imbedding the Issue Department within the 
Bank.  This was that the cash reserves of the whole British banking system would continue to be 
centralised in the Bank of England under the Bank Charter Act of 1844, whereas they would have 
been (much more likely) dissipated more widely amongst the individual banks, including the Bank of 
England, under an independent Currency Board.   
                                                          
2
   According to Fetter, Peel had had prior talks with Cotton and Heath, the Governor and Deputy Governor of 
the Bank of England, (op cit, page 183),  “Out of their discussions came a memorandum from Cotton and 
Heath that was in effect an outline of the act that finally emerged, plus a provision not in the final act that 
would have permitted the fiduciary issue to be exceeded on the authorization of three Ministers of the 
Crown.” 
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The key was that the unissued notes held in the Banking Department provided the margin of 
flexibility which allowed the Bank, under normal circumstances, both to maintain the Gold Standard 
and to manage the regular workings of the financial system, see Sayers, op cit.  In practice the Bank 
had a reaction function, much the same as the Taylor reaction function under an inflation target.  
Thus if the ‘Proportion’, (of unused bank notes to liabilities), fell, it would start being restrictive and 
seek to raise Bank rate,  and vice versa, see the papers by Dutton (1984) and Pippenger (1984), and 
the comment by Goodhart, in ‘A Retrospective of the Classical Gold Standard, 1821-1931’, eds. 
Bordo and Schwartz (1984). 
 
Thus, just as the Inflation Target has been applied flexibly, so was the Gold Standard in the UK.  But 
despite such flexibility, there were, and remain, abnormal occasions when a panic ensued, and there 
is a rush for cash.  After 1844 this led to the need to suspend the Bank Act; in the context of an 
Inflation Target, it led to unconventional monetary policy; again rather similar. 
 
So, under normal circumstances the conduct of monetary policy could be delegated to the Bank, but 
in a crisis, e.g. when the available cash reserves at the Bank were near exhaustion, the Bank had to 
seek support from the Government, and both Bank and Government had to work closely together, 
with the Government taking the lead.  The biggest crisis, by far, was the outbreak of war in 1914, in 
some large part because it was unexpected, right up to the last week, or so, and thus the financial 
system was caught unprepared.  This has now been well documented by Roberts (2013).  The 
ramifications of this crisis were so extensive and threatening that the Government had largely to 
take over the conduct of the monetary response, even going so far as to print and issue its own note 
liabilities,3 (known as a Bradbury, who was the Permanent Secretary of the Treasury), partly because 
the lowest denomination Bank note was £5, and, to conserve gold, the public needed lower 
denomination notes). 
 
During the war, 1914-18, the conduct of monetary policy, e.g. interest rates, exchange rates, 
borrowing both abroad (i.e. in the USA) and at home, became matters of Government policy, with 
the Bank acting as agent and adviser.  Aproblem then arose that the then Governor, Walter Cunliffe 
                                                          
3
   The Bank could have done this itself, but the Treasury insisted that it took the lead. 
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(described by Sayers (1976) as autocratic (p. 67, Vol. 1), and a bully, (p. 101), refused to accept that 
he would have to act under the direction of the Treasury, and in 1917 tried to countermand some 
Treasury orders about the use of gold reserves held in Canada.  That led Lloyd George, then Prime 
Minister to threaten to ‘take over the Bank’ and to present a statement for Cunliffe to sign,4 Sayers 
(ibid, pp 101-109), 
“10 July 1917 
That during the War the Bank must in all things act on the directions of the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer whenever in the opinion of the Chancellor National interests are concerned and 
must not take any action likely to affect credit without previous consultation with the 
Chancellor.” 
 
So, it had now become clear that in any crisis situation, and throughout any major war, the Bank was 
strictly subservient to the Government in general, and to the Chancellor and HM Treasury in 
particular.  But quite what represented a crisis?  In particular the 1931 foreign exchange crisis, and 
its aftermath of international disturbances and then rearmament, did.  Increasingly through this 
inter-war period, pushed on by the collapse of the Gold Standard, the locus for decisions on all the 
major strategic issues of monetary policy shifted from the Bank to the Treasury; the Bank was 
becoming the agent and adviser to Government, rather than the decision maker on monetary policy, 
either domestically or externally.  This process was, of course, greatly reinforced by the exigencies of 
WWII, so by the end of 1945 the Bank was agent and adviser on all policies such as exchange control, 
exchange rate management, interest rates, quantitative controls over banks, etc., but the strategic 
decisions were taken by the Chancellor.  On the main issues of the day, the Bank had become, in 
effect, subservient to the Government, though on the tactical implementation of such strategic 
policies the Bank usually made most of the running. 
 
When the Labour party took over the reins of Government in 1945, it then proceeded to nationalise 
the Bank in March 1946.  In practice this was a purely symbolic gesture; this is exemplified by the 
fact that the Act said absolutely nothing about the purposes and objectives of the Bank; working 
relationships between Bank and the Chancellor/Treasury remained exactly as before, with the Bank 
acting as key agent and adviser, but subservient to the Chancellor/Government in respect of all key 
decisions. 
                                                          
4
   Cunliffe refused to sign, but subsequently wrote a letter of apology in which he agreed that he ‘must not 
attempt to impose my own views on you’. 
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That continued, largely unchanged, until 1997.  The Bank occasionally chafed at such subservience, 
and its influence depended on its knowledge of the workings of financial markets, since the 
Chancellor was inevitably closer to the advice of HMT economists, than to Bank economists.  In 
some large part, the working interactions depended on the personal relationships amongst those at 
the top in the Bank and in HMT, which were notably good between Governor Richardson and 
Chancellor Healey, and bad between Richardson and Thatcher and Lawson. 
 
Macro-economic outcomes were bad in the 1970s, a decade of stagflation, as bad, or worse, than in 
the years after 2008/9, the Great Financial Crisis (GFC).  The attempt to apply monetarist theory, in 
the guise of monetary targets, did largely succeed, during the 1980s, in reducing inflation, but the 
targetry itself appeared fallible, and was succeeded, (after a brief flirtation first with shadowing the 
Dm and then with joining the ERM, 1990-92), in the early 1990s by the adoption of (flexible) inflation 
targets.   
 
In principle such inflation targets could be pursued by a Ministry of Finance, advised by a subservient 
Central Bank.  But the general perception, transformed by academic economists into the technical 
language of ‘time inconsistency’, was that the political authorities would regularly be tempted to 
adopt excessively expansionary policies, most likely in advance of elections.  Although the empirical 
evidence for this syndrome is, in the UK at least, weak, it panders to the public’s general distrust of 
politicians.  So, expectations of future inflation would, indeed, fall if governments, especially left-
wing governments, gave operational independence to Central Banks, subject to an Inflation Target 
set by Government.  And this is what happened in 1997 in the UK.   
 
From 1997 until 2007 this new regime worked perfectly.  The GFC (2008/9) then forced the Bank  to 
take unconventional policy measures, as the official short term interest rate fell towards the zero 
lower bound (ZLB).  Such measures, such as Quantitative Easing and various asset swaps with 
commercial banks, had implications for CB profitability, for debt management and for the workings 
of financial markets that seemed to lie on the boundary between monetary and fiscal policies.  
Consequently the prior clear separation of policy space between Bank and Treasury has become 
fuzzier.   
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Nevertheless, not only was disaster averted in 2008/9 by the strong actions of Central Banks, but 
also the Inflation Target objective has remained intact, (although inflation dipped below target, it 
was not by much, with no deflationary spiral occurring).  But the experience of the GFC has led to a 
second objective, of achieving financial stability, coming back into prominence. 
 
More generally, the more severe the crisis, and the less successful the Central Bank in defusing that, 
the more likely will it be that the Government will take back into its own hands the conduct of 
monetary policy.  For the time being the Bank of England, like most other CBs, has done well enough 
to maintain operational independence.  Whether that can continue is yet to be determined. 
 
2(ii) Debt and Cash Flow Management 
Since the Bank of England was the creature of the Government, the Government naturally used it as 
its usual bank, with the Bank doing for this client what it would do for other clients, that is to 
manage its cash flow, receipts and expenditures, in the most economical fashion, and to advise on 
financing, especially debt management.  Although debt issuance was always the ultimate 
responsibility of the principal, the UK Government, nevertheless the Bank, with its market savvy and 
close connections to markets and market players, was from the outset the key agent and adviser to 
the Government on debt management. 
 
Indeed, it was essential for the Bank’s wider monetary management that it did have this central role 
in debt management.  The Bank was created initially to finance war, and the series of subsequent 
wars dominated the time series of the ratio of debt to GDP, with peaks of around, or over, 200% 
after each of the major wars (Napoleonic 1797-1815, WWI 1914-18, WWII 1939-45), as shown in 
Figure 3 below:- 
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Figure 3 
 
Source: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PSDOTUKA 
 
This massive (post-War) scale of debt had several direct monetary consequences.  First, the 
occasions of debt issuance, debt redemptions and dividend (interest) payment became the main 
seasonal factors influencing cash injections, and, in the case of new issues, cash withdrawals from 
the market.  The Bank had to develop mechanisms for smoothing such discrete, and relatively huge, 
(seasonal) cash flow factors in order to keep control of money market rates; Sayers (1936) is 
particularly good on this. 
 
Second, the Bank was always acutely aware that an arising inability to roll-over the debt, even for 
relatively short periods, as it became due, could flood the system with money, and lead to a 
combined collapse of the Gold Standard (foreign exchange market) and domestic inflation.  
Preserving the health of the gilt-edged market was, hence, always a priority for the Bank, even if that 
could lead at times to temporary monetary control problems. 
 
When debt ratios rise over 100% (or thereabouts; there are no key trigger points), debt and 
monetary management become absolutely inseparable and intertwined.  There have been periods 
when the debt ratio fell sufficiently for this close link to be relaxed.  Mid 19th century until 1914 was 
one such, with most of the debt held in undated Consols.  The unexpected inflation of the 1970s 
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extinguished much of the debt burden of WWII, so the period 1980-2008/9 has been another.  
Nevertheless the removal of debt management from the Bank to a separate, Treasury controlled, 
Debt Management Office (DMO) in 1997 was a hostage to fortune.  In thinking about the 
consequences of Quantitative Easing (QE), it proved problematic to have an independent DMO.  The 
separation would seem to assume the continuance of a debt ratio that would remain low relative to 
the market’s funding capacity.  Should the debt ratio continue its current steady rise, previously 
unparalleled in peace-time, this institutional re-arrangement would need reconsideration. 
 
Normally, in peace-time, the scale of the public sector borrowing requirement has, on average, been 
quite low, though the automatic stabilizers push it up during recessions.  Thus concern about 
inflation has related more to the problems of rolling over the existing debt, (especially in the 
immediate aftermath of wars), and of lengthening the duration of that debt, than about avoiding 
any monetary finance of the current deficit.  Indeed, the Bank has always been prepared to finance 
unexpected public sector shortages through Ways and Means Advances.  But these have been 
meant to be temporary. 
 
Over the centuries, the Bank has smoothed out medium term fluctuations in the Government’s cash 
requirements, from the end of the 19th century onwards largely via variations in Treasury Bill issue, 
and it encouraged structural changes, such as its support for the London Discount Market, from the 
1870s to the 1990s, to achieve that.  Major movements in the ratio of TBs to the monetary base and 
to the broad money supply were, however, a signal and a warning that the underlying liquidity of the 
monetary system was changing.  It was just this kind of analysis that led Sayers, in the later editions 
of Modern Banking (e.g. 1967),  and in the Radcliffe Report, to put more weight on a fuzzier concept 
of liquidity than on a (or the) monetary aggregate. 
 
Currently, with interest now being paid on commercial bank deposits at the BoE, the distinction 
between bank holdings of TBs and bank cash reserves has narrowed considerably, and the overall 
liquidity of the banking system, and of the wider economy, has rocketed upwards.  The only 
comparable occasion was in the immediate aftermath of WWII.  Now, as then, when the time comes 
to reverse engines, there may be a need to re-impose direct controls on banks, since sizeable 
increases in interest rates would be too disruptive (in present over-indebted conditions). 
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2(iii)   Macro-Monetary Policy 
For the greater part of the Bank’s first 300 years, the macro-monetary policy objective of the Bank 
was to maintain an external standard.  From 1694 until 1919, apart from the Suspension, 1797-1821, 
this was maintenance of the Gold Standard5; from WWI until 1925, it was to return to the GS, and 
then from 1925 to 1931 to maintain the GS; and from 1945 until 1971, it was to hold the exchange 
rate pegged against the dollar (and gold).  The periods when the GS was in suspension, 1797-1821, 
1919-1925, 1931-45, were treated as abnormal, due to exceptional war-time (or depression) 
pressures.  Each of these periods led to intense soul-searching, about how we got into this unnatural 
and undesirable state; and how best we could get out of it, especially the exchange rate at which the 
UK should re-peg. 
 
In this context, with an external objective, the standard reaction function was straightforward; raise 
interest rates to protect the peg when the Proportion (available fx reserves) was falling, and lower 
interest rates, in support of the domestic economy, when the reverse was happening.  Perhaps for 
historians, the more interesting question was what else the Bank, and the Government, (because 
here, even more than with Debt Management, the Government was, and remains, the principal and 
the Bank the agent), could do to prop up the pound at times of pressure. 
 
The two standard measures to do so were exchange controls over capital movements and borrowing 
in foreign currency to augment the reserves.  Both measures became increasingly used over time, 
hardly at all before 1900, some foreign currency borrowing in the disturbed period between 1914 
and 1939; and then from 1939 until 1979 exchange controls were comprehensively and continuously 
in place, (the Exchange Control Department had more staff than any other Department of the Bank 
in the 1960s), while the efforts of successive Governors of the Bank to arrange temporary fx 
financing from their colleagues at the BIS fill up several of the Chapters in both Fforde and Capie (op 
cit).   
 
                                                          
5
   Strictly speaking, it was supposed to be a ‘bimetallic standard’ initially, with a de facto gold standard 
emerging in the early 18
th
 century. 
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All this changed after the B.W. system collapsed in the early 1970s, ushering in a ‘non-system’ of 
floating (but sometimes managed) rates between major zones, and pegged, or fixed, rates within 
zones, such as the Eurozone.  In this latter context, how was a ‘floater’, such as the UK, to manage 
macro-monetary policy? 
 
After a confused, and disturbed, few years, 1972-77, the answer in the UK was to become a 
‘pragmatic monetarist’ with targets for broad money, £M3. The Government switched from 
unwilling acceptance (Labour 1977-79) of such a monetarist approach to zealous adherence 
(Thatcherite Conservative 1979-85), whereas the Bank remained pragmatic and sceptical 
throughout.  While the effects on policy outcomes, 1981-85, were much as desired, i.e. falling 
inflation and a strong recovery from the deep recession of 1980-82, monetary targetry itself 
performed poorly, with velocity proving to be unstable and an inability either to forecast or to 
control £M3.  Doubts were cast over which was the ‘best’ aggregate to track, and subsequent targets 
for multiple aggregates were not conducive to credibility.  This led Lawson, when Chancellor, to 
return to a form of pegging, first shadowing the Dm and then joining the Exchange Rate Mechanism. 
 
Fortunately, when the UK was ejected from the ERM in September 1992, a much more robust 
monetary control mechanism had become available, in the guise of a (flexible) Inflation Target.  This 
was successfully introduced in 1992 and from then onwards became the touchstone of monetary 
policy.  This new macro-monetary regime played a significant part (quite how much is debatable) in 
making the years 1992-2007 into a NICE (non-inflationary continuous expansion, to use Mervyn 
King’s phrase) period. 
 
Since 2008/9 the Bank has, however, struggled, like many other Central Banks, despite unparalleled 
expansionary policies, including a four-fold expansion in its own liabilities (i.e. the monetary base) to 
bring about a strong recovery or to return inflation to its 2% target.  Since the problem has been an 
inability of instruments to hit the target, it is not clear why this might indicate that the target itself 
needed reconsideration.  Nevertheless some unhappiness with current macro-economic outcomes 
has been leading to some (but not yet much) questioning both of monetary mechanisms and 
targetry; though there has been much greater discussion about the appropriate conduct of fiscal 
policies. 
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3. The Bank of England and People 
 
3(i) The Bank of England as a commercial bank, and its connections with the public 
The Bank began as a commercial bank, albeit with some special privileges and the advantages of 
being the Government’s preferred bank.  It extended normal (for its day) services of a bank to all 
clients, whether Government (as already discussed), other (country) banks (to be discussed in the 
next Section) or non-bank private clients.  Given this status, it rapidly built up a comparatively large 
balance sheet.  In Table 1 below, we show data taken from Bank of England for each twentieth year 
from 1700 to 2000.  Unfortunately we cannot split either deposits, nor obviously notes in circulation, 
into the sectoral holdings by government, other banks and non-bank private sector, until 1833, 
when we could use estimates from Huffman and Lothian, JMCB (1980).  But even these are of 
limited value since they cannot split deposits at the Bank into bank and non-bank categories, and 
make no allowance for Bank notes, or specie held within other banks rather than by the public.  Thus 
their estimated fall in velocity of high powered-money could have been mainly due to a relative fall 
in non-bank deposits at the Bank. 
Table 1 
 
Liabilities, £   
  
 
Notes In circulation Capital Rest Deposits 
1700 1,616,839 2,201,172 94,767 118,030 
1720 2,493,968 5,559,996 145,062 1,638,821 
1740 4,349,366 8,959,996 307,652 3,906,527 
1760 4,809,102 10,780,000 297,447 3,104,315 
1780 8,032,060 10,780,000 1,347,409 3,154,893 
1800 16,122,102 11,642,400 3,661,150 4,265,575 
1820 22,082,909 14,553,000 3,520,879 3,347,555 
1840 15,720,413 14,553,000 2,878,073 7,801,320 
1860 20,645,310 14,553,000 3,680,876 21,401,325 
1880 26,305,410 14,553,000 3,365,771 33,808,763 
1900 28,437,985 14,553,000 3,752,158 55,550,312 
1920 96,526,440 14,553,000 3,509,269 190,146,815 
1940 531,215,913 14,553,000 3,582,920 184,009,879 
1960 2,111,915,274 14,553,000 3,898,192 340,800,115 
1980 9,651,000,000 14,553,000 0 1,376,447,000 
2000 24,918,000,000 14,553,000 0 55,811,447,000 
 
Source:  http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/Pages/onebank/balancesheet.aspx 
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Deposits from the general public always represented a small proportion of Bank liabilities, and they 
became smaller over time, both relative to notes in circulation, and to the aggregate money stock.  
There were a variety of reasons for this.  First, as Clapham noted (Vol. 1, p. 215), the Bank 
traditionally focussed its private business and operations in London; thus “In the conduct of its 
private business the Bank… lived up to its old nickname of the Bank of London.  Only a London 
resident could have a discount account, and very few non-Londoners… deposited money with it.”  As 
the amalgamation movement (see Sykes, 1926) among small country banks took place in the latter 
half of the 19th Century, the Bank of England stood aside.  This resulted in the establishment of 
comparatively huge joint-stock, limited liability, commercial banks, whose individual size ultimately 
came to dwarf that of the Bank of England.6  As they all had their headquarters in London, (apart 
from the Scottish banks, Royal Bank of Scotland, Bank of Scotland and Clydesdale), they became 
known generically as the London Clearing Banks. 
 
Second, those who managed the Bank, the Court of Directors, never saw it as a profit-maximising 
institution, particularly after Ricardo’s attack on its seignorage profits in 1816 (ibid).  It had special 
responsibilities and obligations, e.g. to maintain the Gold Standard and to support and to advise the 
Government.  So long as the conduct of these duties was consistent with a sufficient return to satisfy 
the shareholders, there was no drive to maximise returns or to expand business.  So few conscious 
steps were taken to drum up new deposit business. 
 
Third, and most important, the role of the Bank as a Central Bank (e.g. in setting money market rates 
and quality standards in bill markets, and in seeking to maintain financial stability, as in the first 
Baring crisis (1891)), was considered by the increasingly (self) important London Clearing Banks from 
about 1900 onwards to be inconsistent with the Bank’s residual role as competitor with those same 
banks for commercial business, (see Goodhart, 1972, pp 100-117).  Indeed, the London Clearing 
Banks even considered establishing a rival Central Banking body in the years around 1910.  In the 
event, however, an unpublished concordat was reached whereby the Bank would allow its existing 
commercial business to run off, and not tender for any such new business, while the Clearing Banks 
in return would accept the Bank of England’s leadership as Central Bank.  Thus, from 1914 onwards 
                                                          
6
   Though, with the advent of QE, the Bank’s balance sheet has ballooned recently, while that of some of the 
Clearing Banks, e.g. RBS, has declined. 
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the Bank effectively ceased to be a commercial bank, though vestiges of its prior commercial 
business hung on for several decades. 
 
3(ii) The Bank as Chief Note Issuer 
The main connection that the Bank has always had with the general public has been in its role as 
note issuer.  From the start, almost all other London bankers ceased issuing their own notes, (see 
Clapham, Vol. 1, p. 162; ‘they found that the Bank note and the cheque met their needs’).  But 
outside London the Country Bankers continued to issue notes, with notes and coins rather than 
deposits being then treated as ‘money’.  Although the greater prestige and solidity of the Bank will 
have meant, almost certainly, that BoE notes will have gained share, possibly considerably so, of 
total bank note issue in England and Wales prior to 1844, (but not in Scotland and probably not in 
Ireland), even so the procyclicality tendency of country bank note issue in England remained a 
continuing concern, (Thornton, 1802). 
 
Naturally the Currency School, aiming to control monetary growth (which in this case was assumed 
to be synonymous with note issue), wished to halt such country bank note issue.  This was done in 
the 1844 Bank Charter Act.  As Clapham notes, Vol. 2, p. 183:- 
“No one but a banker who issued notes on 6 May 1844 may issue in future, and Parliament 
may at any time stop such issue entirely: no bank’s notes may exceed their average in the 
twelve weeks ending 26 April 1844; a lapsed issue cannot be resumed; and a partnership the 
number of whose partners rises above six may no longer issue.” 
 
Effectively from 1844 onwards, with the exception of the Treasury (Bradbury) issue in WWI (already 
noted) the note issue of England and Wales was concentrated solely in the hands of the Bank of 
England.  But the Bank’s lowest denomination note was £5, so for the ordinary working family 
money took the form of coins.   
 
Bank note issue remains entirely passive, meeting demand, (now mainly from banks to fill ATMs), 
from the store of available, but unissued, notes in the Banking Department of the Bank.  The main 
concern with note issue nowadays is the prevention of counterfeiting, (e.g. by holograms), 
durability, (e.g. by now substituting polymer for paper), and symbolism, (e.g. in the choice of 
portraits).  Also the Bank has been careful to restrict the value of the top denomination to £50, in 
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order to make the use of currency in facilitating black and grey economy less easy, see Rogoff 
(2016), The Curse of Cash. 
 
Currency usage surges during war-times, owing to dislocation and the inability to establish repeat 
use credit and trust relationships.  Figure 4 below shows the ratio of currency to deposits from 1921 
to 2016.  Unlike the USA, where there was widespread concern about the solvency and safety of US 
banks, the C/D ratio did not increase sharply during the 1930s in the UK.  For a brief period in 2008/9 
there was a surge in the demand for £50 notes that was probably related to nervousness about UK 
bank solvency.  From 1945 until about 1995 the C/D ratio declined steadily, under the influence of 
technological improvements in payments transactions, starting with greater usage of banks and 
cheque payments, followed by plastic (debit and credit) cards, and later electronic payment 
mechanisms.  More recently, however, the C/D ratio has been rising again, under the influence of 
sharply falling interest rates and the growing use of cash in the grey economy to evade higher levels 
of taxation, see Ashworth and Goodhart (2017, forthcoming). 
 
 
Figure 4: Currency-to-GDP ratios (%) 
 
Source: Ashworth and Goodhart (2017), Friedman & Schwartz (1963), US Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Federal Reserve 
Board, Bank of England, Bank of England Three centuries of macroeconomic data – version 2.2, July 2015 (UK GDP data 
annual prior to 1955), UK Office for National Statistics, European Central Bank, OEF, Bank of Japan, Cabinet Office of Japan. 
For Japan we use Gross Domestic Expenditure until the end of 1979 and Gross Domestic Product subsequently.  
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3(iii) The Bank’s Proprietors (Shareholders) 
In his Appendix presenting the dividends on Bank of England stock, Clapham, (op. cit., Appendix A, p. 
428), notes at the bottom that “Steady dividends aimed at before 1847 and from 1897: the 
intervening half-century is that of maximum competitive activity and fluctuating dividends.”  
Perhaps in the early period, pre 1847, the Bank kept dividends steady, partly to counter criticism 
about seignorage being siphoned off to the benefit of wealthy insiders and, in the good years, to 
build up the strength of the Bank.  But after 1847 the Bank Charter Act forced it to hold a high 
proportion of non-interest bearing notes in the Banking Department, where its profits could mostly 
be made.  After 1844 most, and after 1928 all, of the seignorage income arising in the Issue 
Department went straight to the Treasury.  Meanwhile, its macro-monetary policy role led it to push 
up interest rates during dangerous periods, when fewer clients wished to borrow, except as a Last 
Resort, and to lower rates when funds were flowing into the UK.  On such occasions the Bank often 
had difficulty in keeping money market rates in line with Bank rate (Sayers, 1936), so the Bank would 
lose business to the joint stock banks.  So, its most profitable periods tended to be in crisis years. 
 
I had always thought from my reading of the literature, (e.g. Sayers, op cit, Vol. 1, p. 11), that there 
were some general problems involved in both managing the financial system and maintaining the 
dividend in the decades prior to 1914.  Certainly the commercial banks and the Treasury would have 
liked the Bank then to hold more gold reserves, in order to avoid sharp movements in interest rates 
as external conditions altered (i.e. to be more like the Banque de France).  But that would have 
meant that the Bank would have needed a larger balance sheet to maintain its profits, and that 
would have led to more competition with those same commercial banks.  Moreover, how did the 
Bank reconcile its dual duty to the country and to its proprietors?  An Inspector of Branches, Edye, 
see Clapham, Vol. 2, p. 372, wondered , 
“whether the Bank’s dual position could be maintained.  Was it to be “duty to the public” 
and care of gold, or duty to the proprietors – mostly “trustees, spinsters and clergymen” – 
and the dividend?  If the former, the Bank might as well be nationalized and its stock turned 
into Consols; to him a drab prospect.  To what the latter might lead he did not stay to 
consider.” 
 
In effect, I had believed that it was the former choice that was adopted around that time; so that 
Bank stock became treated as a (riskless) bond with a quasi-constant dividend, and nationalisation in 
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1946 led, in practice, to the transformation of one version of riskless debt into another.  But some 
recent research by my discussant, Forrest Capie, with his co-author, Mike Anson, the Bank’s 
archivist, (2017), shows that the profitability of the Bank, and with that the returns and dividends on 
Bank stock in the years up until 1946, were a good deal greater than I had appreciated. 
 
3(iv) The Bank’s Directors, Governors, Court and Staff 
The proprietors, i.e. the shareholders, of the Bank ceased, after the first few years of its existence, to 
play any significant role in the selection of management of the Bank.  Instead, the management, in 
the form of the Court of Directors, was a self-selecting body, choosing candidates from amongst the 
financial  aristocracy of the City, (with the exception of commercial bankers, who were excluded 
since they competed with the Bank and were also held to be, prior to about 1890, of lower status).  
The Directors generally held full-time roles in their main jobs, e.g. in the Accepting Houses, and 
worked only part-time at the Bank.  Once they had served long enough as Directors, and both 
wanted to do so, and were viewed as sufficiently capable, they would become first Deputy 
Governor, and then immediately the next Governor, each for two-year full time stints.  Prior 
Governors, having ‘passed the Chair’ would often remain on the Court for quite a few years to 
provide experienced advice. 
 
All things considered, this system worked better than might have been expected.  It lasted until 
1914.  Then the problems of war-time finance became so complex that it was felt right to continue 
with Cunliffe, until his personal shortcoming became too great.  Shortly thereafter he was followed 
by Montagu Norman.  In the difficult financial conditions of the post-war period, his expertise and 
command of the issue was viewed as irreplaceable, and he became a fixture, (Sayers, 1976).  After 
his departure, and nationalisation, the Governor and the Deputy Governor(s) became appointed by 
the Government, normally for a five year period, once renewable.  This has now changed once again 
with the arrangements made for the present Governor, Mark Carney, involving a single period of 
office, potentially lasting eight years. 
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Until the interwar years, there was a huge gulf between the Court, the managing body, made up of 
(mostly part-time) upper-class gentlemen7 (no ladies, of course); and the staff of the Bank, the 
clerks, usually from a middle-class background.  Members of staff could rise to leadership roles, 
rather like non-commissioned officers (NCOs) in the army, such as Chief Cashier, Secretary, etc., but 
no further.  Perhaps the best known Bank official ever to work there was Kenneth Grahame, author 
of The Wind in the Willows, who became the Bank’s Secretary, but he left under a cloud for daring to 
express some criticism of Cunliffe.8 
 
During the interwar period this gulf between the Court and the Directors on the one hand, and the 
Bank’s Staff narrowed considerably.  About a decade after WWII, the relationship reversed.  There 
had been a claim that a Bank rate change had been leaked, and used for insider dealing, by a 
member(s) of Court, who, of course, mostly had other City jobs.  Although nothing was ever proven 
in the Bank Rate Tribunal (1955), it was agreed that the Court could no longer be consulted in 
advance of policy changes.  So the Court became a somewhat honorific body, a ‘sounding board’, 
and a means of checking on the Governors and on the efficiency and structure of the Bank, but 
largely divorced from policy making.  In recent years, however, the growing emphasis on financial 
stability and prudential issues, where the procedural structure was less clearly defined, has led to a 
revised role for the Court as an independent arbiter of the process, alongside the Treasury Select 
Committee (TSC) of Parliament. 
 
Even with such a narrowing gulf, the first Governor to be appointed who had worked his way up 
through the Bank’s staff was L.K. O’Brien (1968-73), to be followed in this by Eddie George (1993-
2003).  King (2003-13) went into the Bank, as Chief Economist, in 1991.  Several of the recent Deputy 
Governors have previously come from the Staff, but the majority of the current Deputies have been 
outside appointments, many from the Civil Service, especially the Treasury.  The staff are now 
professionals, rather than clerks, with a sizeable proportion of them being trained economists. 
 
  
                                                          
7
   Though Ricardo dismissed them as a group of traders, and Bagehot described them as ‘merchants’. 
 
8
   There is an apocryphal story that Grahame got his own back by modelling the character of Mr. Toad on 
Cunliffe. 
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4. The Bank and the Banking System 
 
4(i) Managing the payment system 
Once the Bank of England had been established, its privileged position soon made it into the 
dominant (commercial) bank in London.  So, a pyramid of inter-bank relationships then developed, 
with the other London banks holding deposits with the Bank of England, and the myriad of small 
country banks in turn holding correspondent relationships with their own London bank contact, in 
each case to provide for them what they did for their own clients in their own locality, for example 
to hold deposits with the Bank (or London correspondent bank) and to borrow from it at times of 
need.  Perhaps the most important of such banking services was to facilitate payments.  Rather than 
transport gold specie, at great cost and some risk, around the country, a country bank, or indeed any 
depositor, at the Bank could arrange for a payment to be made by drawing on (their deposit at) the 
Bank or their correspondent.  Economies of network scale rapidly led almost all the major financial 
intermediaries in the UK (including in this case the major Scottish and Irish banks) to establish 
correspondent relationships with London, so payments could be effected over the books of the 
Bank. 
 
So the Bank became the manager of the UK’s payment system, and has remained such throughout 
its  history, see Norman, Shaw and Speight (2011).  From time to time it has introduced various 
technical improvements, such as Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS), but these have been essentially 
methods of speeding up, and/or reducing settlement risk, in a process which remains one of clearing 
payments over the ledger pages (once on paper, now electronic) of the Central Bank.  Now, 
however, there is a possibility that, rather than clearing payments over a central ledger (at the 
Central Bank), this could be done over a distributed ledger, using blockchain technology.  Whether 
this latter would still need a trusted Central Party to run, and what role a Central Bank, such as the 
BoE, would have in that process, assuming that it does go ahead, are questions whose answer lies in 
the future. 
 
4(ii) Lender of Last Resort 
In some ways it is a pity that the term ‘Lender of Last Resort’ has become so universally used.  
Country, and other commercial banks, would in the early days, apply to the Bank, as their London 
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correspondent, for a loan, just as any client would go to their own bank to borrow.  Under normal 
circumstances such a correspondent would choose alternative sources of funding, e.g. from the 
Bank, the money market, discounting Bills, etc., depending on terms and conditions.   
 
The phrase Lender of Last Resort, coined by Sir Francis Baring (1797), referred to panic conditions, 
when other usual (market) sources of liquid funds had dried up, and the Bank was (as the strongest 
bank in the country) the sole remaining source of additional cash and liquidity.  The initial and 
proper meaning of LOLR related to occasions when the whole banking and financial system might 
become dysfunctional, as in 2008/9.  Unfortunately its meaning has become misinterpreted, so that 
a bank seen to be borrowing from a Central Bank is often assessed to be only doing so as a Last 
Resort, which naturally has carried with it the danger of massive reputational loss, i.e. serious 
stigma, and has becomes a self-reinforcing equilibrium. 
 
The role that the Bank should play in panic conditions was, however, problematical.  Most often the 
panic would lead both to an external (over the foreign exchanges) and to an internal drain of gold 
from the Bank.  As guardian of the Gold Standard, the natural response of the Bank would be both to 
raise interest rates and either to refuse, or to toughen the terms on, requests for loans.  Instead, 
both Thornton (1802) and Bagehot (1873)9 argued that the Bank must seek to stem the panic by 
combining increased interest rates with ample lending (though after 1844 this might involve 
suspension of the Bank Charter Act). 
 
But at a time of panic, when asset prices in markets were tumbling and everyone was struggling to 
increase liquidity, how was the Bank to avoid risking its own solvency and to prevent those who did 
not really need extra liquidity from borrowing?  The answer that Bagehot gave was to combine high 
interest rates (n.b. he never uses the word ‘penalty’) with the requirement that such lending only be 
done on the basis of first-class collateral, basically government debt or best bank bills. 
 
                                                          
9
   Thornton’s book on The Paper Credit of Great Britain not only precedes Bagehot’s Lombard Street, but it 
also is more profound.  It is a minor scandal that Bagehot fails to cite his predecessor. 
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In their study of the ‘Political Foundations of the Lender of Last Resort’, Calomiris, Flandreau and 
Laeven (2016) state that “the 1833 Act was a watershed”.  Prior to that, notably in 1825, the Bank 
had failed to act as an effective LOLR, partly because of the usury ceiling on interest rates, partly 
because it may have been trying to maximise profits.  They further note that “The parliamentary 
discussion of the decision to make the Bank’s notes legal tender made it clear that legal tender 
status was intended to empower the Bank to act as an effective LOLR”, p. 22. 
 
With the Bank being competitive with other banks for commercial business in the 19th Century, there 
was no question of it acting as a direct supervisor of other banks, either on or off site.  So the Bank 
then had no direct evidence of the solvency of those approaching it for loans, and in any case, then 
and now, solvency is a fuzzy concept, depending, inter alia, on the actions taken by the Bank to stem 
the panic.  So the idea that the Bank should only lend to solvent, but illiquid, borrowers is a 
misconstruction.  What determined whether it would lend was the quality of the collateral on offer. 
 
Of course, the Bank, being a major player in the money market, especially in rediscounting bills of 
exchange, had access to a some generalised appreciation, and the normal gossip, about the business 
of the financial institutions with whom it was dealing.  So, if it had reason to believe that a financial 
institution seeking assistance was in really bad shape, then it could, and would, as in the case of 
Overend Gurney in 1866, refuse to lend.  Equally a financial intermediary, subject to adverse 
rumours, preventing it from borrowing in the market, could, at its own initiative, open its books to 
the Bank, to enable the Bank to mount a rescue, as with Barings in 1891.  Also note that almost all 
the participants in the London money market, and many participants in other London financial 
markets, were technically insolvent after the outbreak of war in 1914.  The idea of shutting them 
down, and with them much of the City, was never seriously considered.   
 
Subsequent history, of the inter-war and post WWII years, is filled with accounts of rescues, some 
overt, some covert, of financial intermediaries in trouble, see Sayers, Fforde and Capie.  Often this 
involved the thinly capitalised  discount houses; again it often involved a considerable degree of 
forebearance.  The life-boat rescue of financial institutions involved in the Fringe Bank crisis, 
1973/74, is one of the wider, and better known, such events, (Reid, 1983). 
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There is no simple dividing line to draw between deciding whether to rescue or to close down a bank 
in severe difficulties.  It depends on circumstances, and weighing up the relative dangers of moral 
hazard and contagion.  in part, perhaps, because this latter is such a difficult exercise, that King in his 
book, The End of Alchemy, (2017), Chapter 7, has suggested reverting back to the original Bagehot 
position, that Bank of England lending should be done solely on the basis of pre-positioned collateral 
on pre-arranged terms, thereby abstracting completely from the difficult questions about whether 
the bank/intermediary is currently solvent and would deserve help. 
 
4(iii) Supervising the banks 
In the field of macro-monetary policy, the aim of achieving price stability has been a constant.  What 
changed was the intermediate means (the target) for doing so, from Gold Standard, to Bretton 
Woods peg, to monetary target, to inflation target.  In pursuit of financial stability, however, ideas 
about, ( and following on from that the structure of), regulation and supervision have changed 
dramatically over the centuries and in recent decades. 
 
Until quite recently, large scale government deficits have almost always been connected with war-
time.  Since war destroyed, rather than created, productive capacity, it was inflationary.  So 
monetary finance of government deficits was anathema to Central Banks.10 11  Instead, banks should 
finance (self-liquidating) bills of exchange, and loans, relating to trade and production; under the 
quantity theory of money financing such ‘real’ bills could neither be inflationary, nor dangerous to 
stability, since the proceeds of trade/output would pay them off.  The ‘real’ bills theory, particularly 
beloved by the Banking School, reigned supreme until the 1930s. 
 
Under this theory the key to supervision lay in monitoring the quality of the bills of exchange passing 
through the money market in London, and in discouraging speculative, or ‘finance’ bills.  Meanwhile 
the institutions that needed most direct, hands-on, supervision were the London Accepting Houses, 
whose acceptances of bills transformed them into the marketable two-name bills (Nishimura, 1971), 
                                                          
10
   Though the need to finance such wars was often the trigger that led the government to establish a ‘central’ 
bank in the first place, as in the case both of the Bank of England and the Banque de France. 
 
11
 The editors of this book noted that ‘the Swedish Riksbank was superceded by the Riksgӓldskonstoret in the 
1990s due to war with Russia’. 
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and the Discount Houses, who made  the prime market for such bills.  The London Discount Houses 
had been fostered by the Bank in the second half of the 19th century to provide a buffer between the 
Bank and the increasingly large London Clearing banks.  Neither the Bank nor these banks were keen 
to deal face-to-face.  So the banks lent short-term to the Discount Houses.  When base money 
became tight, the banks would withdraw such funds, and the Discount Houses would borrow from 
the Bank.  Later on, in the 20th century, the Discount Houses also organised themselves always to 
cover the Treasury Bill tender.  Later in the 1990s the arrival of many foreign banks in the City and 
the development of much more developed wholesale money markets, made the need for the 
Discount House buffer redundant and they disappeared. 
 
Even so, still in 1974, at the outset of the Fringe Bank Crisis, the only financial intermediaries directly 
supervised by the Bank, in the person of the Principal of the Discount Office, were the Discount and 
Accepting Houses!  Commercial banks were not directly supervised by the Bank before 1979.  
Initially this was because the Bank and the banks were competitors, but from the 1930s, when the 
‘real bills’ theory broke down during the Depression, until 1971, another theory and structural 
arrangement took pride of place. 
 
This latter theory was that the root cause of the (US financial and UK industrial) crisis in the 1930s 
was excessive competition, driving down profitability and making financial institutions reach for yield 
by taking on riskier assets.  And the way to counteract this was to encourage cartels, where pricing 
competition would be prevented, and interest rates set by some formula or by the cartel.  Rather 
than encouraging small ‘challenger’ entrants, smaller and/or weaker participants were persuaded to 
merge with bigger (and safer) members.  Montagu Norman followed this general line 
enthusiastically with all kinds of industry, (see Sayers). 
 
But it was in finance that such cartelisation was most marked.  The Building Societies, Finance 
Houses, London Discount Market were all regimented into Associations, and the London Clearing 
Banks had their own cartel.  Rates were all pegged (relative to Bank rate) at net interest margins that 
guaranteed reasonable (not far off average), but unexciting, profit margins.  Capital ratios and 
solvency were not seen as a problem.  If, at the official interest rate chosen for other macro-
economic purposes, credit expansion was too fast, then direct controls, e.g. on hire purchase terms, 
would be applied.  One of the side effects of this system was to make housing finance counter-
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cyclical.  The BSA’s authorised interest rate changes would lag behind money market rates, so when 
such rates were moving up, funds would flow out of the building societies, and there would be a 
mortgage famine. 
 
There is more truth to this theory that it is the ultra-competitive challenger banks that represent the 
main danger to financial stability, than current received wisdom allows, as Northern Rock and Anglo-
Irish Bank exemplify.  Nevertheless the old cartelised, controlled system had serious weaknesses.  It 
restrained innovation, raised costs, benefited the ‘fringe’ institutions not subject to a cartel and to 
direct controls (at the expense of the core), and anyhow was increasingly breaking down by the end 
of the 1960s under the influence of international competition and technology (that facilitated 
globalisation), of which the euro-dollar market was the most tangible feature, (Johnston, 1982).  
Such was the context in which the old system was abandoned in 1971 with the introduction of 
Competition and Credit Control (C&CC). 
 
Neither the Bank nor the banks in the UK had had prior experience of unfettered competition; C&CC 
opened a financial Pandora’s Box.  The big UK banks opted to go for expansion in 1971-73, for 
market share and glory, rather than profit maximisation and safety.  In the early 1970s as in the 
years before 2007, there are almost always sufficient bank CEOs like Fred Goodwin (of RBS) to force 
staider bank managers to go along with the dance, and the result can be an exaggerated boom/bust 
cycle. 
 
Although the application of the ‘Corset’ in the 1970s represented a partial reversion to the prior 
regime of direct control, the experience of the ‘fringe bank crisis’ 1974/75 led to direct supervision 
of the banks.  With the trend being away from direct controls to market mechanisms, the experience 
of banks failing to control themselves in a socially satisfactory fashion implied that there would need 
to be external supervision from the authorities.12 
 
                                                          
12
   There is a school of thought, mainly in the US, that attributes the excessive urge by bank managers for 
expansion to deposit insurance.  This was not the case in the UK where (limited) deposit insurance was not 
introduced until the mid 1970s, and was not made more general until 2007. 
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There was already a patchwork of supervision in place in the early 1970s.  Existing large banks had to 
abide by certain Bank of England rules, especially re exchange controls; new and smaller banks were 
authorised, and supposedly looked after, by the Department of Trade; building societies and finance 
houses had their own oversight bodies.  But the main functions of such supervision related to 
consumer protection, prevention of fraud and adherence to the rules of the relevant association.  
There had been little, or no, concept that supervision was needed to achieve overall financial 
stability. 
 
All this changed in the 1970s.  The Bank set up a new department, Banks and Money Market 
Supervision (BAMMS) in 1974 under George Blunden (Capie, Chapter 12), to supervise UK banks.  
The legal basis for this came later in the 1979 Act.  Meanwhile Governor Richardson encouraged the 
establishment of an equivalent international Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in 1974, 
initially chaired by Bank officials, Blunden and then Peter Cooke, and often described as the 
Blunden/Cooke Committee (Goodhart, 2011).  The Bank played a pioneering role in the 
establishment of international regulation and supervision. 
 
There was very little theoretical (nor empirical) underpinning for such new supervisory practices.  
The general, pragmatic, approach then was to try to identify what were generally accepted to be 
best practices, often how the most admired banks operated, in the industry, and then to seek to 
bring all other participants to behave in the same way.  It was a micro-prudential exercise to try to 
raise the standard of behaviour of each individual bank.  The idea that enhancing self-similarity 
might have macro-prudential dangers was not entertained until much later. 
 
It was the 1980-82 Less Developed (Mexico, Argentina, Brazil) Crisis (LDC/MAB crisis) that focussed 
the attention of regulators/supervisors on capital adequacy.  The potential loss from international 
loans to MAB borrowers then seriously threatened the solvency of the main City Centre banks in NY 
and some large international banks in Europe.  So the Basel I and Basel II Accords focussed on capital 
adequacy.  Prior to the 1970s, concern about systemic stability focussed mainly on cash and liquidity 
adequacy, with capital largely taken for granted; after the 1970s that reversed, with liquidity, 
increasingly available in wholesale markets, largely taken for granted. 
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Governor Richardson had hoped to limit the Bank’s direct supervisory involvement to the big banks, 
with his distinction between banks, as a first tier, and licensed deposit-takers, the second tier, in the 
1979 Act.  That proved unsuccessful, and the Bank was increasingly forced, for example by the 
problems of JMB (Johnson Matthey Bankers) and BCCI (Bank of Credit and Commerce International) 
to expand its supervision to all banks.  Also with the arrival of foreign banks in London and the ability 
of Building Societies to become, or be taken over by, banks, both in the 1980s, the remit of the Bank 
to act as supervisor to banks in the UK, having been almost non-existent up until 1974, suddenly 
exploded to being one of the main functions of the Bank, in terms of use of staff and attention. 
 
Then suddenly, and without any prior warning (or subsequent justification), this whole function (and 
most of the relevant prior staff) was removed by the incoming Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon 
Brown in May 1997 to a new Financial Services Authority (FSA), which was to cover all prudential 
and conduct of business issues for the whole financial system, including all non-bank financial 
intermediaries, as well as banks, such as insurance companies. 
 
But the FSA could not handle a crisis by itself.  In any such crisis the Bank would be needed to 
provide liquidity and the Treasury to cover losses and inject extra capital.  So a Troika of all these 
three parties was established (HMT, Bank, FSA), to monitor and to maintain systemic stability.  But 
when a crisis did arrive, in 2007/8, the Troika did not appear to work well.  The FSA seemed fixated 
on ensuring Basel II capital ratio compliance for banks, and failed to anticipate, or to check, other 
developing causes of financial fragility, such as excessive leverage, shortages of liquidity, the 
property boom (and inappropriate LTV and LTI ratios) and RBS’ ill-fated purchase of ABN-Amro.  The 
crisis caught the FSA unaware.  When it first arrived, in the guise of Northern Rock’s difficulties, 
Governor King cited moral hazard as a reason for limiting assistance.  Whether the resulting delay 
played much of a role in the affair is moot, and the assessment of responsibilities for that whole saga 
remains contentious. 
 
Be that as it may, the working of the Troika in the crisis was held to have failed, at least in the eyes of 
the Conservative opposition and their supporting Press.  So when the Conservatives returned to 
power, in 2010, they decided, once again, to revamp the structure of bank supervision.  Under their 
new Financial Services Act, 2012, prudential regulation, both micro and macro, again for the whole 
financial system not just for the banks, was returned to the Bank, initially in the form of its wholly 
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owned subsidiary, (but now part of the Bank), the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), while all 
conduct of business issues were hived off into a separate body, the Financial Conduct Authority 
(FCA).  The PRA (and FCA) in turn answer to the Financial Policy Committee (FPC), with external 
members, which sets the  strategy and makes the key policy decisions for the PRA, in the sense that 
the FPC can issue Directions and Recommendations to them. 
 
Since 2009, bank regulation, especially for capital, but also for liquidity, and for business structure 
(the Vickers Report), has been tightened, at a time of sluggish recovery and minimal inflation.  In this 
context banks have been casting off leverage and struggling to remain profitable.  Banking in the UK 
remained closer to ‘bust’ than to ‘boom’, so the FPC has so far had a relatively easy ride.  The need, 
perhaps, is to succour rather than to constrain the banks.  And the immediate concern will be how to 
cope with Brexit. 
 
Basically, there is no consensus, yet, on how best to manage the problems of maintaining financial 
stability. 
 
4(iv)  Resolving bank failures 
Prior to the Great Financial Crisis, the last major bank failures in the UK had been in the 3rd Quarter 
of the 19th Century, Overend Gurney in 1866 and City of Glasgow Bank in 1873.  Proponents of a 
‘moral hazard’ viewpoint claim that allowing such failures warned banks thereafter to be more 
careful:  Opponents argued that the Bank and HMT became cleverer in discovering ways of rescuing 
banks [and discount house) running into difficulties, not only in 1914 but on numerous other 
occasions, such as the 1974/5 lifeboat. 
 
Be that as it may, Northern Rock in 2007 was followed by RBS and HBOS in 2008, when the latter 
were bailed out by the injection of public funds.  This led to a political storm, not so much because 
the banks were saved, but more because the bankers’ bonuses and pensions continued to be paid.  
So there was a general revulsion from the use of public funds to support banks in difficulties.  The 
new idea is that a wider range of (bond-holding) creditors will be bailed in, to meet bank losses. 
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Whether this switch of loss-bearing from taxpayers to a narrower segment of bank creditors will 
prove any more successful, either economically or politically, has yet to be seen.  But this new 
resolution process has to be managed.  Under the law as it stood up to the GFC, banks that failed 
were subject to the standard general bankruptcy law.  In the crisis that was seen to be too slow and 
inappropriate for banks.  So the law, applying to banks, has been changed.  The Bank has now been 
also given the responsibility of handling any, and all, instances requiring Resolution, but there was 
little, or no, prior public discussion in the UK whether it was better to place the ‘Resolution 
Authority’ within, or outside the Central Bank. 
 
We will have to wait and see how it works. 
 
 
End-Note 
 
The years of the ‘Great Moderation’, 1992-2007, were very successful, almost triumphant, for most 
Central Banks, notably including the Bank of England, which largely escaped from decades of 
subservience to HMT and to the Government.  But the Great Financial Crisis, 2007-9, has led to 
change in, and uncertainty about, the proper functions of the Bank.  Such change has been most 
marked for giving Central Banks a further major objective, that of achieving financial stability besides 
their primarily objective of price stability, but has also led to questions both about the definition of 
such price stability and the instruments for achieving that.  Meanwhile, and quite remarkably, such 
Central Banks have mostly proved, as yet, unable to bring back inflation to target, (usually 2% p.a.), 
despite the most expansionary policy measures ever adopted. 
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